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Abstract
We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players
compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap
on the players￿bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction
with bid caps and show that capping the players￿bids is pro￿table for a designer who wishes to maximize
the players￿expected total bid.
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1 Introduction
In many competitions, we can often observe situations where severe constraints are imposed on contestants.
For example, in the US electoral campaign, there is a speci￿c maximum campaign contribution that a single
agent can make to a candidate.1 In sports where equipment plays a major role (e.g., sailing, motor races,
etc...) there are very strict, explicit or implicit technological constraints imposed on the allowed equipment.
Also several sports leagues (e.g., the NBA) implement a salary cap, which places a limit on the total amount
of money a team can spend on players￿salaries. The actual amount of the cap varies on a year-to-year basis,
￿Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer￿ Sheva 84105, Israel. Email: anersela@bgu.ac.il,
reutc@bgu.ac.il
1Political Action Committees (PACs) can contribute at most $5,000 per election to a candidate, while individuals can
contribute at most $1,000. About caps in political lobbying see Che and Gale (1998).
1and is calculated as a percentage of the league￿ s revenue from the previous season.2 Professional NBA players
also face a variable salary cap where the maximum amount of money a player can sign for is contingent on
the number of years that he has played and on the total of the salary cap.3
The caps imposed on players have an ambiguous e⁄ect on their bids. On the one hand, relatively weak
players believe they will have a higher chance to win and therefore will make more e⁄ort than in a contest
without a bid cap. On the other hand, relatively strong players will make less e⁄ort than in a contest without
a bid cap. The e⁄ect of the bid cap on the players￿total bid, therefore, depends on the trade-o⁄ between
the increase of the weaker players￿e⁄ort and the decrease of the stronger players￿e⁄ort. The all-pay auction
would seem to be the natural model to examine the e⁄ect of bid caps because of its simple structure and
its advantages over other contest forms.4 Various applications of all-pay auctions have been made to rent-
seeking and lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in labor markets, sports
competitions, trade wars, and military and biological wars of attrition. La⁄ont and Robert (1996), for
example, showed that an all-pay auction with a reserve price is a revenue-maximizing mechanism for selling
one object to bidders who face linear costs and a common and common-knowledge ￿xed budget constraint.
Maskin (2000) showed that an all-pay auction is constrained e¢ cient, namely, it maximizes expected welfare
subject to incentive-compatibility and budget constraints. These results subsequently motivated several
researchers to study the e⁄ect of bid caps in all-pay auctions. Che and Gale (1998) calculated the bidding
equilibrium of a complete information all-pay auction with two bidders having di⁄erent valuations for a prize
and linear cost functions, and demonstrated that a bid cap can increase the players￿total bid. Gavious,
Moldovanu and Sela (2003) studied symmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information and showed
that, regardless of the number of bidders, if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a
2For instance, in 2007-08, the NBA salary cap was approximately US $55.63 million per team, and for the 2008-09 season it
was $58.68 million. The 2009-10 salary cap has been set at $57.7 million.
3The maximum salary of a player with 6 or fewer years of experience is $9,000,000 or 25% of the total salary cap (2009-10:
$14,472,500). For a player with 7￿ 9 years of experience, the maximum is $11,000,000 or 30% of the cap (2009-10: $17,310,000),
and for a player with 10+ years of experience, the maximum is $14,000,000 or 35% of the cap (2008-2009: $20,195,000).
4The economic literature on all-pay auctions is quite extensive. All-pay auction models with complete information about
the prize￿ s value to di⁄erent players have been studied, among others, by Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye Kovenock and de
Vries (1993, 1996) and Siegel (2009). All-pay auctions with incomplete information about the prize￿ s values, have been studied,
among others, by Krishna and Morgan (1997) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006).
2bid cap is not pro￿table for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid. On the other hand, if
agents have convex cost functions (i.e. an increasing marginal cost) then e⁄ectively capping the bids is
pro￿table for a designer facing a su¢ ciently large number of bidders. Sahuguet￿ s (2006) ￿ndings indicate
that in asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information and linear cost functions, capping the
bids may be pro￿table for the designer who wishes to maximize the average bid. Kirkegaard (2009) studied
asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which a strong and a weak contestant compete
and where a contestant may su⁄er from a handicap or bene￿t from a head start. His results show that it is
generally pro￿table to give the weak contestant a head start but it may or may not be pro￿table to handicap
the strong contestant. He also found that the weak contestant may have a head start as well as a handicap.5
All the above mentioned papers dealt with bid caps in one-stage all pay auctions. Works on bid caps in
sequential multi-stage contests, particularly sequential all-pay auctions, are relatively sparse.6 The reason
for this gap is that the e⁄ect of bid caps in sequential multi-stage contests on players￿equilibrium strategies
is much more complex to analyze than in one-stage contests, as a bid cap in any stage of a sequential contest
a⁄ects not only the players￿strategies in that stage but also the players￿strategies in all the other stages.
Therefore a bid cap may increase the players￿e⁄ort in some stages but decrease it in others. In this paper,
we extend the model of the sequential two-stage all-pay auction under complete information studied by Sela
(2010) by allowing the designer to impose bid caps in each of the two stages. Our model has two players
and two identical prizes and each player may win more than one prize. The players￿marginal values are
non-increasing such that the marginal value of the second prize is not larger than the marginal value of the
￿rst one. In our sequential model like in Che and Gale (1998), a bid cap in the second stage will increase
the players￿total bid in this stage. But, a bid cap in the second stage may decrease the players￿bid in the
￿rst stage such that it is not clear at all that a bid cap in the second stage is as e⁄ective as in the one-stage
all-pay auction. Furthermore, a bid cap in the ￿rst stage does not only change the players￿bids in the ￿rst
5Konrad (2002) examined a two-bidder model under complete information with head starts and handicaps.
6The literature presents only a few sequential auctions with constrained bidders. For example, Pitchik and Schotter (1988)
studied complete information sequential auctions with two ￿nancially constrained bidders and two independent objects. Benoit
and Krishna (2001) extended this model to more than two bidders, assuming synergies among the objects and that budgets
chosen by the bidders. They note that the seller may bene￿t from budget constraints, but that this feature cannot occur in
their model if only one object is auctioned.
3stage but also the players￿probabilities of winning in that stage. Thus a bid cap in the ￿rst stage changes
the players￿expected bid in the second stage as well. However, despite this seemingly complex e⁄ect of bid
caps on players￿strategies in our sequential all-pay auction, we show that by choosing the right bid caps the
designer can always increase the players￿total bid. In particular, we show that to increase the total bid it is
su¢ cient to cap the players￿bids in the ￿rst stage. However, this last result does not imply that the bid cap
in the second stage is not pro￿table for a designer who wishes to maximize the players￿total bid. Indeed, we
show that if there is no dominant player such that both of his marginal values are larger than those of his
opponent, the combination of bid caps in both stages of the sequential all-pay auction is the optimal setting.
It is important to emphasize that our aim in this work is not to ￿nd the optimal design of a sequential two-
stage all-pay auction that maximizes the players￿bids. Rather, we wish to show that a designer who wants
to maximize the expected total bids in sequential contests should consider the use of bid caps, particularly
the use of a bid cap in the ￿rst stage of the contest.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our sequential two-stage all-pay auction
with bid caps. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the equilibrium behavior in both stages of this model. In
Section 5 we analyze the e⁄ect of the bid caps on the expected total bid. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a sequential all-pay auction with two players (denoted by i = a;b) and two stages (denoted by
t = 1;2). In each of the stages, a single (identical) prize is awarded. Let vi
j denote player i0s marginal value
for winning his j-th prize. That is, if player i wins only one prize his value is vi
1 and if he wins two prizes
his value is vi
1 + vi
2: We assume that the marginal values are non-increasing, namely, vi
1 ￿ vi
2, and that they
are common knowledge.
Each player i submits a bid (e⁄ort) in the ￿rst stage xi
1 ￿ d1 where d1 2 [0;1] is a commonly known bid
cap. The player with the highest bid wins the ￿rst prize and all the players pay their bids. The players know
the identity of the winner in the ￿rst stage before the beginning of the second stage, such that the players￿
values in the second stage are common knowledge. Then, each player i submits a bid in the second stage
xi
2 ￿ d2 where d2 2 [0;1] is a commonly known bid cap. The player with the highest bid in the second stage
4wins the second prize and all the players pay their bids. We assume that the bid caps can be controlled by
the contest designer who wishes to maximize the players￿total (average) bid in both stages.
3 Equilibrium - second stage
In order to analyze a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two players
we begin by analyzing the second stage and go backwards to the ￿rst stage. We assume ￿rst that there is no
bid cap in the second stage. Then, if player i￿ s value in that stage is vi; i = a;b, where va ￿ vb; according to
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996), there is always a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in which players
a and b randomize on the interval [0;vb] according to their bid cumulative distribution functions, which are
given by
vaFb(x) ￿ x = va ￿ vb
vbFa(x) ￿ x = 0
Thus, player a￿ s equilibrium bid is uniformly distributed; that is
Fa(x) =
x
vb
while player b￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Fb(x) =
va ￿ vb + x
va
Player a0s probability to win is 1￿ v
b
2va and his expected payo⁄ is va ￿vb, while player b0s probability to win
is v
b
2va and his expected payo⁄ is zero.
Now, assume that there is a bid cap d2 2
￿
0;vb￿
in the second stage. Note that if d2 > vb the bid cap is
not e⁄ective since it is not binding to the players. According to Che and Gale (1998), if d2 2
h
0; v
b
2
i
there is
an equilibrium with pure strategies in which each player submits a bid equal to the bid cap v
b
2 . Then each of
the players wins with a probability of 0.5 and the expected payo⁄of player i = a;b is v
i
2 ￿d2: If d2 2 ( v
b
2 ;vb]
there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which players a and b randomize on the interval [0;2d2 ￿vb][fd2g
5according to their bid cumulative distribution functions, which are given by
vaFb(x) ￿ x = va
￿
Fb(2d2 ￿ vb) +
1 ￿ Fb(2d2 ￿ vb)
2
￿
￿ d2
vbFa(x) ￿ x = vb
￿
Fa(2d2 ￿ vb) +
1 ￿ Fa(2d2 ￿ vb)
2
￿
￿ d2
Here the LHS of the above equations are the expected payo⁄s of the players if they submit a bid x 2
[0;2d2 ￿ vb] and the RHS are the expected payo⁄s if they submit a bid equal to d2: Thus, player a￿ s
equilibrium bid is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Fa(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
x
vb if x 2 [0;2d2 ￿ vb]
2d2￿v
b
vb if x 2 (2d2 ￿ vb;d2)
1 if x = d2
while player b￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Fb(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 ￿ v
b￿x
va if x 2 [0;2d2 ￿ vb]
1 ￿ 2v
b￿2d2
va if x 2 (2d2 ￿ vb;d2)
1 if x = d2
Then, player a0s probability of winning in the second stage is 1￿ v
b
2va and his expected payo⁄is va￿vb, while
player b￿ s probability of winning is v
b
2va and his expected payo⁄ is zero. Note that in the case where d2 2 (
v
b
2 ;vb] the players￿probabilities of winning and their expected payo⁄s are the same as in the case without a
bid cap.
4 Equilibrium - ￿rst stage
We divide the analysis of the equilibrium in the ￿rst stage into three cases: 1. We have a bid cap d1 in the
￿rst stage only. 2. We have a bid cap d2 in the second stage only. 3. We have bid caps d1 and d2 in both
stages. Suppose ￿rst that there is a bid cap d1 in the ￿rst stage only, and assume that player i￿ s marginal
value in stage t = 1;2 is vi
t: If player a wins in the ￿rst stage his payo⁄ is va
1 and then the players￿values
in the second stage are va
2 and vb
1: If va
2 > vb
1; the expected payo⁄ of player a will be va
2 ￿ vb
1 in the second
stage. Otherwise, if va
2 ￿ vb
1, the expected payo⁄ of player a in the second stage will be zero. Thus, if player
a wins in the ￿rst stage, his expected payo⁄ in both stages is va
1 + maxfva
2 ￿ vb
1;0g:
6If player a doesn￿ t win in the ￿rst stage then the players￿values in the second stage are va
1 and vb
2. If
va
1 > vb
2; the expected payo⁄ of player a will be va
1 ￿ vb
2 in the second stage. Otherwise, if va
1 ￿ vb
2, the
expected payo⁄ of player a in the second stage will be zero. Thus, if player a does not win in the ￿rst stage
his expected payo⁄ is maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g: A similar argument holds for player b: The induced value of each
player in the ￿rst stage (denoted by b vi
1;i 2 fa;bg) is the di⁄erence between his expected payo⁄in the contest
whether he wins or not in the ￿rst stage. Thus, the induced values of the players in the ￿rst stage are:
b va
1 = va
1 + maxfva
2 ￿ vb
1;0g ￿ maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g (1)
b vb
1 = vb
1 + maxfvb
2 ￿ va
1;0g ￿ maxfvb
1 ￿ va
2;0g
Note that since the players￿marginal values are positive, the induced values are positive as well. Then, using
the induced values, the players￿equilibrium strategies in the ￿rst stage of the sequential two-stage all-pay
auction can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 Assume that b v
j
1 ￿ b vk
1; j;k 2 fa;bg: Then, in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the sequential all-pay auction with a bid cap d1, the players￿strategies in the ￿rst stage are as follows7: If
d1 2
h
0;
b v
k
1
2
i
both players use the pure strategies
xa = xb = d1
If d1 2
￿
b v
k
1
2 ;b vk
1
i
, player j￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to
F
j
1(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
x
b vk
1
if x 2 [0;2d1 ￿ b vk
1]
2d1￿b v
k
1
b vk
1
if x 2 (2d1 ￿ b vk
1;d1)
1 if x = d1
(2)
while player k￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to
Fk
1 (x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 ￿
b v
k
1￿x
b v
j
1
if x 2 [0;2d1 ￿ b vk
1]
1 ￿
2b v
k
1￿2d1
b v
j
1
if x 2 (2d1 ￿ b vk
1;d1)
1 if x = d1
(3)
7The subgame-perfect equilibrium given by Proposition 1 is unique as long as d1 6=
b vk
1
2 : If d1 =
b vk
1
2 , there may be multiple
equilibrium strategies in the ￿rst stage.
7Proof. See Appendix.
Suppose now that there is a bid cap d2 in the second stage only. We assume that d2 2
h
0;min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 )
i
since otherwise the bid cap in the second stage is not necessarily binding to both players. We omit the
equilibrium analysis for when d2 > min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 ); namely, for when a bid cap is binding to only one of the
players or is not binding to both players, since these cases are not relevant to our study. Then, given that
the bid cap d2 is binding to both players, if player a wins in the ￿rst stage his payo⁄ in this stage is va
1 and
in the second stage the expected payo⁄ of player a will be
v
a
2
2 ￿d2 . Thus, if player a wins in the ￿rst stage,
his expected payo⁄in both stages is va
1 +
v
a
2
2 ￿d2: If player a doesn￿ t win in the ￿rst stage his expected payo⁄
in the second stage is
v
a
1
2 ￿ d2: A similar argument holds for player b: The induced values of both players in
the ￿rst stage, which are the di⁄erences between their expected payo⁄s in the contest whether they win or
not in the ￿rst stage, are given by
e va
1 =
va
1 + va
2
2
;e vb
1 =
vb
1 + vb
2
2
Using the induced values, the players￿equilibrium strategies in the ￿rst stage of the sequential two-stage
all-pay auction with a bid cap in the second stage can be stated as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose that e v
j
1 ￿ e vk
1; j;k 2 fa;bg: Then in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
sequential two-stage all-pay auction with a bid cap d2, the players￿strategies in the ￿rst stage are as follows8:
If d2 2
h
0;min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 )
i
, player j￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to
F
j
1(x) =
x
e vk
1
(4)
while player k￿ s equilibrium bid is distributed according to
Fk
1 (x) =
x + e v
j
1 ￿ e vk
1
e v
j
1
(5)
Proof. See Appendix.
We assume now that the bid caps in both stages are binding. As was shown above, the bid cap in the
second stage is binding to both players i⁄ d2 2
h
0;min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 )
i
: We now ￿nd the values of d1 that are
binding to both players in the ￿rst stage. If player a wins in the ￿rst stage, his payo⁄ is va
1 ￿ d1 and in the
8The subgame-perfect equilibrium given by Proposition 2 is unique as long as d2 < min(
va
2
2 ;
vb
2
2 ): If d2 = min(
va
2
2 ;
vb
2
2 ),
according to Che and Gale (1998), there are multiple equilibrium strategies in the second stage.
8second stage the expected payo⁄ of player a will be
v
a
2
2 ￿ d2 . Thus, if player a wins in the ￿rst stage, his
expected payo⁄ in the both stages is va
1 +
v
a
2
2 ￿d1 ￿d2: If player a doesn￿ t win in the ￿rst stage his expected
payo⁄ in both stages is
v
a
1
2 ￿d1￿d2: A similar argument holds for player b: Since both players have the same
probability to win in the ￿rst stage and both choose to participate in the ￿rst stage we have for all i 2 fa;bg;
1
2
(vi
1 +
vi
2
2
￿ d1 ￿ d2) +
1
2
(
vi
1
2
￿ d1 ￿ d2) ￿
vi
1
2
￿ d2 (6)
where the LHS is the expected payo⁄of player i in the sequential all-pay auction and the RHS is the expected
payo⁄ of player i if he would participate in the second stage only. Thus, by (6) we obtain that
Proposition 3 In the sequential two-stage all-pay auction with bid caps d1 and d2; if d2 2
h
0;min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 )
i
and d1 2
h
0;min(
v
a
1+v
a
2
4 ;
v
b
1+v
b
2
4 )
i
there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which both players choose
d1 in the ￿rst stage and d2 in the second stage.9
Using the above equilibrium analysis we now examine the e¢ ciency of capping the players￿bids for a
designer who wishes to maximize the players￿expected total bid.
5 Total bid
As previously mentioned, Che and Gale (1998) showed that in the one-stage all-pay auction an endogenous
bid cap is pro￿table for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total bid. In this section, we
generalize this result and show that in the sequential two-stage all-pay auction endogenous bid caps increase
the players￿expected total bid. Moreover, we show that a bid cap in the ￿rst stage only is su¢ cient to
increase the expected total bid.
If there is no bid cap in the ￿rst stage, the players￿equilibrium strategies are given by Proposition 1
where d1 is equal to the lower induced value, namely, d1 = b vk
1: Then the expected total bid in the ￿rst stage
of the sequential all-pay auction is given by
b v
k
1
2 (1 +
b v
k
1
b v
j
1
): If player j wins in the ￿rst stage and that happens
with probability 1 ￿
b v
k
1
2b v
j
1
, then the expected total bid in the second stage is
minfv
j
2;v
k
1g
2 (1 +
minfv
j
2;v
k
1g
maxfv
j
2;vk
1g). But
if player k wins in the ￿rst stage and that happens with probability
b v
k
1
2b v
j
1
, then the expected total bid in
9The subgame-perfect equilibrium given by Proposition 3 is unique as long as d2 < min(
va
2
2 ;
vb
2
2 ):
9the second stage is
minfv
j
1;v
k
2g
2 (1+
minfv
j
1;v
k
2g
maxfv
j
1;vk
2g): Thus, the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction
without any bid cap is given by
TE0 =
b vk
1
2
(1 +
b vk
1
b v
j
1
) + (1 ￿
b vk
1
2b v
j
1
)
minfv
j
2;vk
1g
2
(1 +
minfv
j
2;vk
1g
maxfv
j
2;vk
1g
) +
b vk
1
2b v
j
1
minfv
j
1;vk
2g
2
(1 +
minfv
j
1;vk
2g
maxfv
j
1;vk
2g
) (7)
On the other hand, if there is a bid cap in the ￿rst stage d1 =
b v
k
1
2 ; 10 by Proposition 1 the expected total bid in
the ￿rst stage is 2d1 = b vk
1; and the expected total bid in the second stage is either
minfv
j
2;v
k
1g
2 (1+
minfv
j
2;v
k
1g
maxfv
j
2;vk
1g)
or
minfv
j
1;v
k
2g
2 (1+
minfv
j
1;v
k
2g
maxfv
j
1;vk
2g) with the same probability. Thus, the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay
auction with a bid cap d1 =
b v
k
1
2 in the ￿rst stage is given by
TE1 = b vk
1 +
1
2
minfv
j
2;vk
1g
2
(1 +
minfv
j
2;vk
1g
maxfv
j
2;vk
1g
) +
1
2
minfv
j
1;vk
2g
2
(1 +
minfv
j
1;vk
2g
maxfv
j
1;vk
2g
) (8)
Note that if the bid cap in the ￿rst stage satis￿es d1 2
￿
b v
k
1
2 ;b vk
1
i
, based on Che and Gale (1998), the expected
total bid and the players￿probabilities of winning in the ￿rst stage are exactly the same as without a bid
cap. Therefore the expected total bid in both stages is the same as in the sequential all-pay auction without
a bid cap. In the following, by comparing the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction without
bid caps and with a bid cap in the ￿rst stage, we demonstrate that capping the bids increases the players￿
expected total bid.
Theorem 1 For every sequential all-pay auction there are bid caps (d1;d2) > (0;0) that increase the players￿
expected total bid. In particular, the total bid in the sequential all-pay auction with a bid cap of d1 =
b v
k
1
2 in
the ￿rst stage (d2 = 0) is larger than the expected total bid without bid caps.
Proof. See Appendix
So far, we have shown that capping the players￿bids in the ￿rst stage increases their expected total bid.
The e⁄ect of the a bid cap in the second stage, however, is ambiguous since it a⁄ects the players￿strategies
in both stages. In other words, while we know that a bid cap increases the players￿expected total bid in the
second stage it might decrease the players￿expected total bid in the ￿rst stage such that the total e⁄ect of
the bid cap in the second stage is not clear and will depend on the exact marginal values of the players in
both stages. However, below we show that a bid cap in the second stage can be an optimal complement to a
10This is the maximal value of the bid cap in the ￿rst stage that is binding to both players.
10bid cap in the ￿rst stage such that bid caps in both stages might be the optimal setting. By Proposition 3,
if there is a bid cap in each of the stages of the sequential all-pay auction and both caps have the maximal
values which are binding to both players then the players￿expected total bid is given by
TE12 = 2d1 + 2d2 = 2min(
v
j
1 + v
j
2
4
;
vk
1 + vk
2
4
) + 2min(
v
j
2
2
;
vk
2
2
) (9)
A comparison of (9) and (8) yields
Proposition 4 If the players￿values satisfy vi
1 ￿ v
j
2 i;j 2 fa;bg then the sequential all-pay auction with bid
caps in both stages yields a higher expected total e⁄ort than the sequential all-pay auction with a bid cap in
the ￿rst stage only.
Proof. See Appendix.
It can be easily veri￿ed that if the condition of Proposition 4, according to which vi
1 ￿ v
j
2 i;j 2 fa;bg
does not hold, that is, there exists a dominant player such that his both values are larger than both values
of his opponent, then the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction with bid caps in both stages is
not necessarily larger than the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction with a bid cap in the ￿rst
stage only. Hence, the optimal setting for a designer who wishes to maximize the players￿expected total bid
could be either with a bid cap in one stage only or in the second stage only or in both stages. In any case,
bid caps are e⁄ective for increasing the expected total bids in the sequential all-pay auction.
6 Concluding remarks
The research in contest design has found that capping the players￿bids (e⁄orts) may be pro￿table for a
designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort. These results have been proved for one-stage
all-pay auctions with a single prize. In this paper we examined the e⁄ect of bid caps also in a sequential
two-stage all-pay auction. We showed that a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total bid should
impose bid caps. In particular, we showed that the expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction with
the optimal bid cap in the ￿rst stage is larger than in the sequential all-pay auction without bid caps. We
also found that the bid cap in the second stage of a sequential all-pay auction may have a positive e⁄ect on
11the players￿expected total bid. The optimal bid caps in the sequential two-stage all-pay auctions depend on
the players￿valuations and they may be imposed in the ￿rst stage only, in the second stage only or as we
showed in both stages. However, imposing a bid cap in the ￿rst stage, independent of the players￿valuations,
increases the players￿total bid and it is most likely that this positive e⁄ect will hold for a sequential all-pay
auction with any number of stages.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Without loss of generality, assume that b va
1 > b vb
1. If d1 2
h
0;
b v
b
1
2
i
then both players use the pure strategies
xa = xb = d1 and their expected payo⁄s in the contest are
ua =
va
1
2
+
maxfva
2 ￿ vb
1;0g
2
+
maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g
2
￿ d1;ub =
vb
1
2
+
maxfvb
2 ￿ va
1;0g
2
+
maxfvb
1 ￿ va
2;0g
2
￿ d1
The equilibrium pure strategies in the ￿rst stage of the sequential two-prize all-pay auction are unique
as long as d1 <
b v
b
1
2 : If d1 =
b v
b
1
2 ; the expected payo⁄ of player b in the contest may be equal to zero, and then
player b does not necessarily choose d1 and might stay out of the contest with a positive probability.
If d1 2
￿
b v
b
1
2 ;b vb
1
i
there is no pure strategy equilibrium and similarly to the one-stage all-pay auction with
a bid cap the players randomize on the interval [0; b x] [fd1g according to their e⁄ort cumulative distribution
functions, Fa
1 (x) and Fb
1(x); which are given by the following indi⁄erence conditions:
(va
1 + maxfva
2 ￿ vb
1;0g)Fb
1(x) + (maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g)(1 ￿ Fb
1(x)) ￿ x
= (va
1 + maxfva
2 ￿ vb
1;0g)(Fb
1(b x) +
1 ￿ Fb
1(b x)
2
) + (maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g)(1 ￿ Fb
1(b x) ￿
1 ￿ Fb
1(b x)
2
) ￿ d1
(vb
1 + maxfvb
2 ￿ va
1;0g)Fa
1 (x) + (maxfvb
1 ￿ va
2;0g)(1 ￿ Fa
1 (x)) ￿ x
= (vb
1 + maxfvb
2 ￿ va
1;0g)(Fa
1 (b x) +
1 ￿ Fa
1 (b x)
2
) + (maxfvb
1 ￿ va
2;0g)(1 ￿ Fa
1 (b x) ￿
1 ￿ Fa
1 (b x)
2
) ￿ d1
where the LHS of the above equations are the expected payo⁄s of the players if they submit a bid x 2 [0; b x]
and the RHS are the expected payo⁄s of the players if they submit a bid equal to d1:
12Using the induced values b va
1;b vb
1; the above indi⁄erence conditions can be written as
b va
1Fb
1(x) ￿ x = b va
1(Fb
1(b x) +
1 ￿ Fb
1(b x)
2
) ￿ d1 (10)
b vb
1Fa
1 (x) ￿ x = b vb
1(Fa
1 (b x) +
1 ￿ Fa
1 (b x)
2
) ￿ d1
The system of equations (10) describing the players￿mixed strategies Fa
1 (x);Fb
1(x) in the ￿rst stage of the
sequential two-prize all-pay auction with a bid cap d1 is identical to that of the equilibrium strategies of
players in the standard one-stage all-pay auction with a bid cap d1 where the players￿values are the induced
marginal values b va
1;b vb
1. Hence, according to the analysis of the standard one-stage all-pay auction (Che and
Gale 1998), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the ￿rst stage of the sequential two-prize all-pay
auction which is given by (2) and (3). Then the players￿expected payo⁄s in the contest are
ua = b va
1 ￿ b vb
1 + maxfva
1 ￿ vb
2;0g
ub = maxfvb
1 ￿ va
2;0g
Q:E:D:
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Without loss of generality, assume that e va
1 > e vb
1. If d2 2
h
0;min(
v
a
2
2 ;
v
b
2
2 )
i
then the players randomize in the
￿rst stage according to their e⁄ort cumulative distribution functions, Fa
1 (x) and Fb
1(x); which are given by
the following indi⁄erence conditions:
(va
1 +
va
2
2
￿ d2)Fb
1(x) + (
va
1
2
￿ d2)(1 ￿ Fb
1(x)) ￿ x =
va
1 + va
2
2
￿
vb
1 + vb
2
2
+
va
1
2
￿ d2
(vb
1 +
vb
2
2
￿ d2)Fa
1 (x) + (
vb
1
2
￿ d2)(1 ￿ Fa
1 (x)) ￿ x =
vb
1
2
￿ d2
Using the induced values e va
1;e vb
1; the above conditions can be written as
e va
1Fb
1(x) ￿ x = e va
1 ￿ e vb
1
e vb
1Fa
1 (x) ￿ x = 0
Hence, based on the analysis of the standard one-stage all-pay auction (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
1996), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the ￿rst stage of the sequential two-prize all-pay
auction which is given by (4) and (5). Q:E:D:
137.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that the players￿values in both stages are v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4. Given that the players values are
non-increasing we have three possible cases:
A : va = (v1;v4);vb = (v2;v3):
B : va = (v1;v3);vb = (v2;v4):
C : va = (v1;v2);vb = (v3;v4):
We wish to show that for all these cases, independent of the values of vi; i = 1;2;3;4, the expected total
bid in the sequential contest with a bid cap in the ￿rst stage TE1 (given by (8)) is larger than the expected
total bid in the sequential contest without any cap TE0 (given by (7)). In all of these cases, by (8) and (7)
we obtain that if the players￿induced values are identical, namely, b va = b vb, then TE1 = TE0: Below we
show that for each of the three cases A;B and C; the point at which b va = b vb is the maximal point of the
di⁄erence TE0 ￿ TE1:
7.3.1 Case A: va = (v1;v4);vb = (v2;v3)
In this case, by (1) the players￿induced values are b va = v3 and b vb = v4: By (8) and (7) we have
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
v1v3v2
4 + v1v2v2
4 + v2v2
3v4 ￿ v1v2v2
3 ￿ v2v3
3 ￿ v1v3
4
4v1v2v3
(11)
By a simple calculation, (11) has the form
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
(v3 ￿ v4)(v1v2
4 ￿ v1v2v3 ￿ v1v2v4 ￿ v2v2
3)
4v1v2v3
(12)
Since v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4 > 0, we obtain that v1v2
4 ￿v1v2v3￿v1v2v4￿v2v2
3 ￿ ￿(v1v2v4+v2v2
3) ￿ 0: Then,
since v3 ￿ v4 ￿ 0 we have TE0 ￿ TE1 ￿ 0. Therefore, by (12) the maximal value of TE0 ￿ TE1 is obtained
when v3 = v4 and this value is equal to zero.
7.3.2 Case B: va = (v1;v3);vb = (v2;v4)
In this case, by (1) the players￿induced values are b va = v4 and b vb = v3: By (8) and (7) we have
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
v2v3v2
4 + v1v2v2
4 + v1v2
3v4 ￿ v1v2v2
3 ￿ v1v3
3 ￿ v2v3
4
4v1v2v3
(13)
14By a simple calculation, (13) has the form
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
(v3 ￿ v4)(v2v2
4 ￿ v1v2
3 ￿ v1v2v3 ￿ v1v2v4)
4v1v2v3
(14)
Since v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4 > 0, we obtain that v2v2
4 ￿v1v2
3 ￿v1v2v3 ￿v1v2v4 ￿ ￿(v1v2v3 +v1v2v4) ￿ 0: Then,
since v3 ￿ v4 ￿ 0 we have TE0 ￿ TE1 ￿ 0. Therefore, by (14) the maximal value of TE0 ￿ TE1 is obtained
when v3 = v4 and this value is equal to zero.
7.3.3 Case C: va = (v1;v2);vb = (v3;v4)
In this case, by (1) the players￿induced values are b va = v2 + v4 ￿ v3 and b vb = v3: We divide the analysis
into two sub-cases.
1. If v2 + v4 ￿ 2v3, then by (8) and (7) we have
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
v1v2v3v4 + 3v1v2v2
3 + 2v2v3v2
4 + v1v2
3v4
4v1v2(v2 + v4 ￿ v3)
(15)
￿v1v2
2v3 ￿ v1v2
2v4 ￿ v1v2v2
4 ￿ v2
2v2
4 ￿ v2v3
4 ￿ 2v1v3
3
4v1v2(v2 + v4 ￿ v3)
By a simple calculation, (15) has the form
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
(v2 + v4 ￿ 2v3)(v1v2
3 ￿ v1v2v3 ￿ v2v2
4 ￿ v1v2v4)
4v1v2(v2 + v4 ￿ v3)
(16)
Since v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4 > 0, we obtain that v1v2
3 ￿ v1v2v3 ￿ v2v2
4 ￿ v1v2v4 ￿ ￿(v2v2
4 + v1v2v4) ￿ 0: Then,
since v2 + v4 ￿ 2v3 ￿ 0 we have TE0 ￿ TE1 ￿ 0. Therefore, by (16) the maximal value of TE0 ￿ TE1 is
obtained when v2 + v4 = 2v3 and this value is equal to zero.
2. If v2 + v4 ￿ 2v3, then by (8) and (7) we have
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
3v1v2v2
3 + 2v2v3v2
4 + 3v1v2
2v4 + v1v2v2
4 + v1v2
3v4 + 2v1v3
2
4v1v2v3
(17)
￿3v1v2v3v4 ￿ 5v1v2
2v3 ￿ 2v1v3
3 ￿ v2
2v2
4 ￿ v2v3
4
4v1v2v3
By a simple calculation, (17) has the form
TE0 ￿ TE1 =
(2v3 ￿ v2 ￿ v4)(v1v2v3 + v2v2
4 ￿ 2v1v2
2 ￿ v1v2v4 ￿ v1v2
3)
4v1v2v3
(18)
15Since v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4 > 0, we obtain that v1v2v3 + v2v2
4 ￿ 2v1v2
2 ￿ v1v2v4 ￿ v1v2
3 ￿ ￿(v1v2v4 + v1v2
3) ￿ 0:
Then, since 2v3 ￿v2 ￿v4 ￿ 0 we have TE0 ￿TE1 ￿ 0. Therefore, by (18) the maximal value of TE0 ￿TE1
is obtained when v2 + v4 = 2v3 and this value is equal to zero.
Q:E:D:
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that the players￿values satisfy va
1 ￿ vb
2 and vb
1 ￿ va
2. Given that the players￿values are non-increasing
we have two possible cases:
A : va = (v1;v4);vb = (v2;v3)
B : va = (v1;v3);vb = (v2;v4)
where v1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3 ￿ v4:
In case A by (8) and (9), if v1 + v4 ￿ v2 + v3, we have
TE12 ￿ TE1 =
v1v2(v3 ￿ v4) + v2(v1v2 ￿ v2
3) + v1(v2
2 ￿ v2
4)
4v1v2
￿ 0
and if v1 + v4 < v2 + v3 we have
TE12 ￿ TE1 =
v1v4(v2 ￿ v4) + v1v2(v1 ￿ v3) + v2(v2
1 ￿ v2
3)
4v1v2
￿ 0
In case B by (8) and (9) we have
TE12 ￿ TE1 =
v2v4(v1 ￿ v4) + v1v2(v2 ￿ v3) + v1(v2
2 ￿ v2
3)
4v1v2
￿ 0
Thus, we obtained that the players￿expected total bid in the sequential all-pay auction with bid caps in
both stages is larger than in the sequential all-pay auction with a bid cap in the ￿rst stage only. Q:E:D:
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